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_______________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the effects of political regimes over state capacity or the 
quality of government (QoG): do democratic states perform better than authoritarian 
ones?  Previous studies on this puzzle point to a nonlinear relationship between 
democracy and government quality.  We argue that QoG is a function of both forces of 
supply (leaders which have the power to make reforms) and demand (citizens’ desire for 
mid-to-long term investments over short term needs), the latter of which is a function of 
economic development.  In democratic states, leaders have stronger incentives to improve 
QoG after a certain degree of wealth is reached, while in poorer countries they have little 
incentive for long-term bureaucratic investments.  Thus we predict that the relationship 
between democracy and QoG is conditional, based on economic development. With over 
125 countries in our sample, we test our hypothesis using time series, panel data and 
spatial models and find strong empirical support for our claim.  
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1. What is the effect of democracy on quality of government?  
There is a general acceptance among scholars and policy-makers on the crucial role of 
government institutions for the welfare of its citizens. “Good governance”, “state capacity” or 
“quality of government” foster social and economic development.1 Dysfunctional and corrupt 
government institutions play a central role in many of the world’s most pressing economic and 
social problems (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 166).2 While the socio-economic consequences of 
what, for the sake of simplicity, this paper calls “quality of government” (QoG) are well 
understood, its causes remain unclear and subject to controversy.3 An intriguing unsolved debate 
is the one regarding the impact of political regimes on QoG. Put simply, do democratic states 
work better than authoritarian ones?  
Many theoretical reasons have been put forth as to why democracies should exhibit 
higher QoG than autocracies.4 However, the empirical evidence in favor of the democratic 
hypothesis is, at best, mixed. In the first place, qualitative literature has provided exhaustive case 
studies showing how corruption has increased -and QoG decreased- after moves towards 
democracy. That would, for example, be the case of many developing countries after 
decolonization (see Lemarchand 1972 on Africa, Scott 1972 on Southeast Asia, Wade 1985 on 
India, or Sayari 1977 on Turkey), of several post-communist countries after 1990 (see Varese 
                                                 
1 Although there is a large literature on the two-way causality between institutions and economic 
development (and we deal with this issue later in the paper), there is also a solid body of evidence showing 
causality from institutions to income (e.g. Acemoglu, Johson and Robinson 2001, Rodrik and Trebbi. 2004. 
For a review, see Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2007). 
2 Rothstein and Teorell (2008) offer a review of the main literature on the consequences of quality of 
government. For a non-academic review, see The Economist 13-03-2008.  
3 By Quality of Government we are referring in this paper to what others in the literature have termed 
“State Capacity” or “Administrative Capacity” (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) –that is, the capacity a state has 
to perform its activities in an efficient way and without corruption. Thus, following this literature we are 
primarily concerned with accounting for variation in public sector bureaucratic performance and 
corruption. We borrow the term “Quality of Government” (QoG) from Rothstein and Teorell (2008), 
because the term “Capacity” has been more extensively used to depict the size or the level of resources –or 
even the capacity to raise taxes- a state has while we are more interested in how the state takes advantage of 
the resources it manages – that is, in its “quality”. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, QoG could be 
interchangeable here by the standard definitions in the literature of state capacity or administrative capacity.    
4 We discuss such reasons in greater detail in the following section of the analysis. 
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1997 on Rusia), and of many Latin American countries after different waves of democratization 
(see Weyland 1998).  
This has led to a number of significant quantitative studies, which have also explored 
what Harris-White and White (1996: 3) and Sung (2004: 179) define as the “contradictory” 
relationship between democracy and corruption. Studies in this literature have increasingly 
pointed to the existence of a non-linear relationship between democracy and quality of 
government. Generally speaking, in comparison with authoritarian regimes, democracy has a 
negative impact on QoG in the early stages of democratization.  From there onwards, the effect 
becomes positive. This non-linear relationship has been explained by two different dimensions of 
democracy.  One hypothesizes about the level of democracy and the other about the time of 
exposure to, or historically accumulated experience with democracy. The two dimensions have 
been tested independently. Regarding the level of democracy, it has been found, using continuous 
measures of political regimes, that QoG is highest in strongly democratic states, medium-high in 
strongly authoritarian regimes and lowest in states that are partially democratized. Due to the use 
of different empirical specifications, this non-linearity has been defined as either a U-shaped (e.g. 
Montinola and Jackman 2002), a J-shaped (e.g. Bäck and Hadenius 2008) or an S-shaped (e.g. 
Sung 2004) relationship. In relation to the time of exposure or historical experience with 
democracy, the finding is that younger democracies produce worse QoG than older ones (Keefer 
2007: 804). In sum, the general idea in the literature is that partial or young democracies perform 
worse than authoritarian regimes and much worse than full or older democracies. The puzzle this 
paper addresses is thus why democracy seemingly impacts quality of government negatively in 
some cases and positively in others.     
This analysis contributes to the theoretical and an empirical literature in a number of 
ways. First, we explore alternative mechanisms through which democracy may affect QoG. 
Although previous institutionalist studies offer several mechanisms, the question remains as to 
why democracy impacts government quality in divergent ways depending on its level/age. Based 
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on recent culturalist contributions to this literature as well as theoretical developments in 
economic history, this paper suggests that an additional explanation for this ‘U-’, ‘J-’ or ‘S-’ 
shaped relationship can be found in the interaction between some basic characteristics of a society 
and its political regime. It is necessary to complement institutional explanations with cultural 
arguments which account for the extent to which actors prefer to consume now rather than later.   
We argue this is determined by economic development.  Thus this paper also serves as a synthesis 
between institutionalist and culturalist approaches to QoG.    
In particular, this analysis argues that there is an interaction effect between the supply of 
QoG, determined by the incentives for rulers to provide bureaucratic efficiency and lower 
corruption (i.e. the level of democracy) and the demand for QoG from ordinary citizens on their 
government to make mid-to-long term investments in bureaucratic capacity.  As a country’s 
standard of living increases, so do the demands from citizens for future investments in the state.  
Essentially, we claim that the impact of democratization on quality of government is contingent 
upon levels of economic wealth: at low levels of economic development, democracy is expected 
to have a negative effect on QoG, while at higher levels a positive relationship is expected.  
In addition to the previous alternative explanations to this hypothesis, this paper also 
offers the first systematic test of the effects on QoG of the two main dimensions of democracy 
pointed to in previous literature – level of democracy and time of exposure or historically 
accumulated experience with democracy. The results show that, when we include standard 
control variables and analyze cross-time and space variations, the impact of the two primary 
alternative hypotheses (i.e. level and time of democracy) on QoG drop out of significance when 
accounting for our central hypothesis. The type of political regime becomes relevant for 
explaining QoG only when interacted with the level of development of the country. The main 
empirical finding is that poorer countries have higher quality of government under authoritarian 
rule while moderate-to-wealthier countries perform better under democratic rule.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prevailing 
accounts for the non-linear relationship between political regimes and QoG. Section 3 develops 
the theory of the paper following recent contributions to the QoG literature by Welzen and 
Inglehart (2008) on the importance of citizens’ values as well as contributions to economic 
history by Clark (2007) on the relevance of time preference rates. Section 4 describes the data and 
methods used in the time series comparative analysis (Section 5) and in the cross-sectional one 
(Section 6). Section 7 concludes.    
2. The Puzzle: The Non-Linear Effect of Democracy on Government Quality 
Montinola and Jackman (2002) present the first large-N cross-country analysis showing that the 
effect of democracy on the level of corruption is significant but nonlinear. The best performers 
would be highly democratic countries while some authoritarian countries would exhibit only 
slightly less corruption than countries at intermediate levels of democracy. Despite the originality 
of their results, Montinola and Jackman’s (2002) study is limited by the low number of 
observations (66) and by the cross-sectional nature of the analysis. The cross-sectional design 
becomes especially relevant when there is reason to suspect the existence of a reverse causality 
between the independent and dependent variables. The probability of a notable two-way causality 
between democracy and QoG makes it difficult to assess the real impact of the former over the 
latter by analyzing one single point in time.  While cross-sectional analyses allow us to test the 
strength of a correlation between two or more variables, only time series can demonstrate 
causality in the sense of Granger (1969) – if ‘X’ at time ‘t’ significantly impacts ‘Y’ at ‘t’+1 
(with ‘Y’ at time ‘t’ also known).  This is especially salient when discussing concepts such as the 
process of democratization and QoG, which are certainly expected to change over time.  How one 
impacts the other diachronically is of vital importance for understanding this relationship. 
Bäck and Hadenius (2008) address both limitations by analyzing a larger dataset and 
using time series. Their empirical model, which addresses the direction of causality, represents 
the starting point of this paper’s statistical analysis. Bäck and Hadenius (2008) show a curvi-
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linear relationship between the level of democratization and “administrative capacity” over time 
using panel data.  They confirm the existence of a significant relationship between democracy 
and administrative capacity that is negative at low levels of democratization, yet positive at high 
levels. This is shown with a statistically significant squared variable in their primary statistical 
model (Bäck and Hadenius 2008:11). While reporting this ‘J’ shaped relationship over time 
between these two variables is a substantial contribution to the literature, the mechanisms -
through which democracy impacts government quality in divergent ways depending on its level- 
that they propose are more debatable.  
Bäck and Hadenius’s hypothesis is that administrative capacity is the result of two types 
of steering and control: from above (for which authoritarian regimes are better equipped by virtue 
of their hierarchical and repressive capacity) and from below (which democracies enjoy thanks to 
a more extensive press freedom and electoral participation). Therefore, countries with low levels 
of democracy are in a delicate position. While they have lost the top-down control capacities of 
dictatorships, the institutions of bottom-up control (e.g. active voters, free media) are only 
partially in place. This is an original theoretical proposition and, in addition, Bäck and Hadenius 
offer a detailed account of the different arrangements that characterize top-down and bottom-up 
control systems in dictatorships and democracies respectively.  
Nevertheless, their theory lacks micro-foundations –we do not know who decides to exert 
control, why and when. Therefore, it is not clear how some theoretical statements are derived. For 
example, in full democracies there seems to be a “synergy between the two forms” of control in 
which “the direction is applied in dialogue and cooperation” and “the statutory auditing is 
combined with a more popular and social form” (2008: 16). This structuralist depiction in which 
individuals are absent leaves us with several uncertainties: what does a ‘synergy’ mean? How 
does it arise? Which particular individuals decide to cooperate and why? More importantly, Bäck 
and Hadenius’ theoretical framework requires a strong underlying assumption on actors’ 
preferences, which can be considered overly optimistic. All rulers and all citizens are expected to 
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be interested in increasing administrative efficiency and reducing corruption. None of them seem 
to derive utility from corrupt activities. If rulers (in a dictatorship) and citizens (in a democracy) 
cannot improve QoG it is not because they are not interested, but because the proper control 
instruments are not in place. Although not stated explicitly, corruption and administrative 
mismanagement are assumed to solely be the work of and exclusively benefit state officials. 
These would take advantage of their privileged access to resources when well-intentioned rulers 
and citizens lack efficient control mechanisms.   
 In contrast, Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) and Keefer (2007) provide a theory with micro-
foundations for understanding the non-linearity between democracy and QoG, as well as an 
empirical test. Unlike Bäck and Hadenius, the key element is not the level of democracy, but the 
time of exposure or experience a country has had with democratic institutions. Young 
democracies fall short of older democracies in several indicators of government performance 
because of the inability of their politicians to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. 
Building reputations as providers of good public policies is costly for politicians and it takes time. 
Thus, while politicians in older democracies may be in conditions to achieve it, politicians in 
younger democracies may prefer to rely on patrons, whose clients trust them but not the citizens. 
The result is that younger democracies will tend to over-provide clientelistic policies –including 
corrupt practices- instead of public goods. 5     
Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) assume that credibility is costly to build for the provision of 
public goods. Nevertheless, one can also expect corrupt exchanges to be subject to severe and 
costly credibility problems. As shown by several authors, the relationship between politicians’ 
credibility and corruption could also be the opposite to Keefer and Vlaicu’s: the more difficulties 
politicians have to credibly promise that particular corrupt practices will continue in the future, 
the lower the size of bribes rent-seekers are willing to pay (McChesney 1987; Montinola and 
                                                 
5 In particular, Keefer (2007) shows that younger democracies under-provide non-targeted goods (e.g. 
universal education, secure property rights), over-provide targeted goods (e.g. jobs and public work 
projects), and are more corrupt. 
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Jackman 2002). In addition, relying on patron-client relations can also be very costly, as the 
literature on corrupt electoral systems has demonstrated. For example, studies on the Victorian 
Britain show that sustaining clientelistic networks of support amounted to on average £1,885 for a 
typical borough.6 Not only good policies do require trust (and money) between rulers and 
constituencies, but bad policies require them as well.  
 Empirically, Keefer (2007) shows how more years of democracy is correlated with better 
government performance. Yet he does not control for the level of democracy and excludes 
countries that have never had a competitive election, implying that it is mainly the time of 
exposure to democracy that matters. However, it is plausible to think, as Bäck and Hadenius 
(2008) show, that the level - and not only the age - of democracy may affect politicians’ ability to 
build reputations. Keefer (2007) is conscious of another flaw in his analysis: the problematic use 
of the variable age of democracy as a proxy for the mechanism of his theory -the acquisition of 
political credibility. Of course it is not only a function of the years of democracy that matter, but 
what happens during those years in terms or reputation building. For this reason, to test this 
credibility hypothesis, in our empirical analysis -thanks to the use of time series - we can replace 
age of democracy with a simple measure of the accumulated experience with democracy 
throughout time a country has.   
After reviewing Bäck and Hadenius (2008) and Keefer (2007), the empirical question 
remains as to which one of the two dimensions really matters for QoG. Is it the level of 
democracy –i.e. the extent to which political leaders are subject to fair and competitive elections 
in a particular moment- or the time of democracy –i.e. the experience accumulated by politicians 
in building reputations across time? This paper tests both hypotheses for the first time 
simultaneously.  In addition, following Keefer, we consider that “...it is clear that democratic 
experience alone is far from a necessary condition for credibility” (2007: 820) and therefore 
                                                 
6 Put in terms of what a person earned in 2006, this would imply campaign costs above £1,500,000 for each 
candidate in each constituency (Kam 2008).   
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additional explanations are needed to resolve this puzzle. Thus, we argue that these previous 
models are underspecified and our analysis explores a new theoretical mechanism to better 
understand the nonlinear relationship between political regimes and QoG. As developed in the 
next section, we argue that quality of government is motivated by two primary factors: the 
citizens’ preferences for it (demand side) and the rulers’ incentives to create it (supply side). In 
sum, methodologically, this paper follows the comparative advantage of each one of these two 
contributions to the literature. Like Keefer and Vlaicu (2007), this paper offers a theory with 
micro-foundations. Like Bäck and Hadenius (2008), we explore cross-time variations as well as 
cross-sectional ones.   
3. Theory: Demand and Supply of QoG  
The “Demand Side” of QoG: Culturalist Theories 
The theoretical arguments reviewed in the previous section share a common institutionalist 
approach. That means that the preferences of actors –following standard rational-choice 
assumptions- are kept fixed and the explanation for different levels of QoG depends on how 
institutions shape the incentives of individuals. Moreover, they tend to be supply side 
explanations. The key actors are the ones who supply QoG: rulers.7 The incentives of rulers 
change from one particular type (or sub-type) of political regime to another and that leads to 
better or worse QoG. The demanders of QoG (i.e. citizens) play, if any, a minor role. The 
inhabitants of a country are assumed to be hard-working individuals, would-be inventors ready to 
develop new technologies if rulers provide them with good institutions and low corruption.8 
Nonetheless, there is an extensive and alternative body of theory and evidence showing, as 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 53) put it, that “it is by no means clear that the villain is 
                                                 
7 QoG would depend on “the incentives and constraints that face those who make governmental and legal 
decisions” (Clague et al. 1996: 243).  
8 As Clark (2007: 210) points out, “the preferred assumption [by political economy institutionalists] is that 
the desires and rationalities of people in all human societies are essentially the same. The medieval peasant 
in Europe, the Indian coolie, the Yanomamo of the rain forest, the Tasmanian Aboriginal, all share a 
common set of aspirations and a common ability to act rationally to achieve those aspirations. What differs 
across societies, however, are the institutions that govern economic life.” 
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necessarily the ruler.” In this analysis, we intend to explore these claims further using insights 
from culturalist approaches. 
For culturalist theories, political institutions (e.g. the characteristics of political regimes) 
are kept fixed and what would drive the change in QoG would be the variation in social 
preferences or values. Unlike institutionalists, it would not be rulers, but “ordinary people”, using 
Welzel and Inglehart’s (2008: 126) term, that constitute the main driving force. A country’s QoG 
would be the result of the prevailing values in its society. There is less agreement though in the 
exact content of those good/bad values for government.  
Earlier culturalists argued that corruption stems from (immoral) social norms that 
emphasize “tribal loyalty” rather than the rule of law (Banfield 1958; Wraith and Simkins 1961). 
More recent versions, on the contrary, establish the relevant distinction between “survival” versus 
“self-expression” values (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Similar to classic modernization theories, 
and actually using several times the term “modernization”, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) argue that 
economic development increases individuals’ resources, making them more articulate and better 
equipped to participate in politics. Instead of being focused on day-to-day survival, citizens will 
give priority to freedom of choice and, generally, to self-expression values. In those 
circumstances, citizens will be able to mount more powerful collective actions and place pressure 
on elites to provide good governance.  
Welzel and Inglehart (2008) show the strong statistical association between, first, the 
level of economic development and the prevalence of self-expression values in a society, and, 
second, those values as a proxy for good government.9 Despite the fact that their empirical 
analysis does not control for other relevant variables (unlike institutionalist approaches and this 
                                                 
9 In addition, building on the more elaborate empirical evidence from Inglehart and Welzen (2005), Welzen 
and Inglehart (2008: 136-137) re-interpret the results of two notable recent contributions on the 
relationships between democracy and economic development –Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2005)- as a support for their hypothesis. The main variables in both studies, according to Welzen and 
Inglehart, would be proxies for the degree of modernization –or the prevalence of self-expression values -  
in a given society.  
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paper do), Welzel and Inglehart (2008) shed some light on what for institutionalists were outliers. 
For example, the relatively “modern” East Germany and Czechoslovakia by the early 1990s, or 
Spain by the late 1970s, were able to build higher QoG than an institutionalist theory would 
predict given their short experience with democracy. However, as previously discussed, cross-
sectional correlations of the sort provided by Welzel and Inglehart (2008) do not probe either the 
direction of the causality -maybe good governance produces self-expression values-10 or the 
existence of causality at all –self-expression values can be correlated with other variables such as 
educational levels.  
Generally speaking, the main problem with cultural explanations is the problematic 
scientific tractability of values. Evidence shows us that there are examples of high QoG in 
different parts of the world in different periods of time, but particular social values are changing 
continuously both cross-time and cross-nationally. Similar to culturalist approaches, we argue 
that people’s motivations and values play an important role on good governance, but we focus on 
a value which can travel well across time and space: time preference or subjective future discount 
rate. That is, that, everything else being equal, people prefer to consume now rather than later. 
This value has been extensively used by economists, but overlooked in the QoG literature. Its 
main advantage is that it is neutral in terms of preferences –i.e. it does not matter what people 
want to consume, but how they want to consume it. As a result, future discount rate, which could 
be defined as a content-free value, may travel well across societies with different characteristics.       
The “Demand Side” of QoG: Economic History and the “Future Discount Rate” 
‘Values’ are receiving increasing attention in economic history. As Clark (2007) argues, the 
available evidence indicates that the advent of democracy in Britain and the security of property 
rights it implied (i.e. the traditional institutionalist explanation) was not the only factor driving the 
decrease in interest rates that would eventually lead to the industrial revolution. There was an 
                                                 
10 See the work of Rothstein (with Eek 2006, with Uslaner 2006, and with Stolle forthcoming) for evidence 
and theoretical discussions on how good government may affect social values, like the degree of inter-
personal trust. 
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unnoticed but relevant cultural change in the Britain of those years: the spread of “middle-class 
culture” throughout the society (2007: 259). Unlike previous culturalist explanations, Clark 
mostly focuses on a measurable aspect of Britain’s culture that has been overlooked in the 
literature: time preference or ‘future discount rates’. He offers evidence showing that the risk 
premium element of interest rates (i.e. the one which could be affected by institutions) did not 
decisively change during the decades before the industrial revolution. Thus, what drove the 
decline in interest rates was the other relevant component of them: the subjective future discount 
rate. Following extensive research by anthropologists and economists, Clark assumes that the 
future discount rate (or the degree of “impatience”) sharply declines with income: richer 
individuals have a lower time preference rates than poorer individuals. Nevertheless, once an 
individual has lowered her future discount rate, meaning once she has become more patient, drops 
in income will hardly alter it.11  
In sum, (democratic) institutionalist theories of the industrial revolution - focused mostly 
on the behavior of rulers - should be complemented with other explanations accounting for the 
behavior of the vast majority of the society - such as variations in subjective future discount rates. 
Similarly, we contend here that the interplay between time preferences and democracy helps 
explain the emergence of QoG.   
Following these insights in economic history as well as the culturalist approaches 
reviewed above, we assume that a country’s ‘future discount rate’ is a function of its economic 
development.  As a country becomes more economically developed, its future discount rate is 
expected to decrease - that is, it becomes ‘less impatient’. Two problems may arise with this 
assumption that future discount rates can be measured by income. First, it is not based on an 
economic theory which accurately describes the exact mechanisms through which income affects 
discount rates. These mechanisms are not self-evident in the literature. To start with, as 
                                                 
11 Economists have thought of time preference rates as being hard-wired into people’s psyches (Clark 
2007:172; for a full description of this approach, see Rogers 1994). 
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economists and anthropologists have shown, the existence of time preference in consumption 
cannot be derived from consideration of rational action (Clark 2007:172).12 Despite the lack of a 
unifying theory, evidence systematically shows correlations between income and lower future 
discount rates. In general, the finding in economics is that poor people tend to have a higher 
propensity to consume vis-à-vis invest for future consumption.13 Although we acknowledge that 
this assumption - not supported by a rational theory - might be controversial, we argue that it is 
less controversial than assuming a null impact of income on future discount rates, thus ignoring 
the body of evidence that points out a relationship between those variables. The fact that 
something remains irrational for standard economic theory (e.g. poorer people, if they were fully 
rational, should be more patient than they are) does not make it false.   
Secondly, it can be argued that what drives the drop in future discount rates is not income 
per se. It is probably that other factors, such as an increase in the standards of livings, or in the 
educational levels or in the self-expression values noted by Welzen and Inglehart (2008), which 
allow individuals to think less myopically. The unavailability of reliable panel data on these other 
alternative variables - together with the fact that there are strong correlations between these 
factors and income levels - induces us to use income as a proxy for all these factors that would 
affect what some people would define as the level of “sophistication” or “modernization” of a 
society –or, as we prefer to call it here, the subjective future discount rate prevailing in a society.   
 As a society’s future discount rate decreases, its willingness to invest long term 
increases.  Put simply, it is plausible to expect that lower income societies (countries with high 
future discount rates) will demand different goods from government institutions than higher 
income societies. Because investments in improving bureaucratic capacity (QoG) are costly and 
                                                 
12 The most extreme cases of high discount rates have been found in pre-market societies. One of the most 
standard examples would be the case of the Hadza of Tanzania depicted by Woodburn (1980: 101): their 
future discount rate was so high that, when collecting berries, to ease the present harvest they often cut 
entire branches from the tree without any regard to future loss of yield. 
13 See Kaldor (1955: 2) for an earlier formulation of this idea and Clark (2007: 172) for a review of the 
evidence from experiments and anthropologists’ research. 
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require patience to benefit from potential improvements, lower income societies are expected to 
over-value a State able to deliver goods  for immediate consumption (e.g. patronage jobs, direct 
cash through clientelistic exchanges) and will under-value States which undertake medium-to-
long term investments in administrative capacity (e.g. develop a meritocratic recruitment system, 
start the legal steps for enacting and implementing rule of law, fight favoritism and corruption), 
which are a function of the discount rate.   
It is important to note here that we do not claim people with higher future discount rates 
prefer corruption and rent-seeking or, following traditional culturalist ideas, that they find 
corruption morally correct. Actually, most humans, irrespective of their cultural background, tend 
to perceive corruption as something wrong.14 People who heavily discount their future simply are 
relatively less ready to pay the short-term costs of building QoG. On the contrary, higher income 
societies in which individuals posses lower time preference rates will place higher pressure on the 
State to undertake (costly at short- but beneficial at medium- and long-term) investments in 
building administrative capacity and reduce corruption.  
The “Supply Side” of QoG: Political Institutions and the Interaction Effect 
       Different social demands for good governance cannot totally explain the observed level of 
QoG. It is necessary to take into account the “supply side” as well. Institutions can be expected to 
shape rulers’ incentives. For the sake of simplicity, we only consider here the most basic scenario. 
We use the simplest assumption of culturalist approaches in relation to citizens - i.e. the future 
discount rate is dependent on the income. And we also use the simplest assumption of 
institutionalist or political economy models regarding rulers: that, democratic rulers derive their 
utility from being re-elected –which means to be responsive to citizens’ demands or, at least, to 
the interests of a relatively large constituency. Autocrats, on the contrary, are responsive solely to 
                                                 
14 One intuitive proof is that in almost all contexts the suitcase with the money is passed below the table 
(The Economist, “The Etiquette of Bribery”, Dec 19th 2006). 
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their interests –being them to maximize their revenue (Olson 1993) or maximize their survival in 
power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). 
Figure 1 shows the level of QoG predicted as a result of the interplay between the future 
discount rates of citizens and the institutional incentives of rulers. Democratic rulers in low-
income countries can be expected to be responsive to citizens’ demands for goods of immediate 
consumption, such as patronage jobs or clientelistic policies. Or, using the terminology of Welzen 
and Inglehart, in low income countries people’s self-expression values - which would lead to 
demand better QoG - would be “subordinated to the needs for subsistence” since “survival is 
precarious” (2008: 133). Rulers will lack incentives to undertake costly medium-long investments 
in improving administrative efficiency (e.g. meritocratic reforms) and the result will be a low 
QoG. This prediction is similar to the literature that in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized that 
democracy unleashes pressures for immediate consumption. Democracy would generate an 
explosion of demands for current consumption, reducing investment and hence retarding 
growth.15 
***Figure 1 about Here*** 
On the contrary, in low-income societies, the existence of a ruler with a counter-
balancing low future discount rate may be beneficial for QoG relative to low-income 
democracies. Obviously, dictators may simply fulfill the immediate consumption demands of 
most or some of their fellow citizens. Actually, many autocrats do so, as the stereotypical 
example of the African Kleptocrat shows. Nevertheless, as Bates (2001) illustrates, unless 
dictators control sufficient resources on their own (e.g. natural resources or substantial foreign 
aid, from which they can extract resources effortlessly), their survival in office and their capacity 
to amass revenue will critically depend upon the capacity of others to produce economically 
(2001:102). Thus, there are reasons to argue that many dictators will behave, using Olson’s 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Galenson (1959) - who argued that “the more democratic a government is, the greater 
the diversion of resources from investment to consumption”- or Huntington (1968). For a critical review of 
this literature, see Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 54-55). 
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(1993: 567) terminology, as a “stationary bandit” with an “encompassing interest in his domain”. 
It may benefit many autocrats to invest in the provision of a peaceful order and other public 
goods that increase productivity - such as, for instance, to build QoG.  
The paradigmatic examples of dictators who heavily invested in the development of QoG 
would be those of the Asian “tigers”, like Park of South Korea, or of Southern European 
countries, like Franco of Spain. A large body of literature shows that QoG was not achieved by 
these rulers despite their lack of responsiveness to citizens’ demands, but, quite the opposite, 
because of it (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 56). It was not the state’s responsiveness to society, 
but “state autonomy” as the literature refers to, that led to improvements in QoG. The insulation 
of rulers from citizens’ demands for immediate consumption goods allowed the former to 
undertake the costly investments in building administrative capacity. Generally speaking, the 
autonomy of autocrats from the high distributional pressures existing in a developing economy 
would increase the government’s ability to provide public goods and impose short-term costs 
(Haggard 1990: 57).  
Having noted this, it is important to state that the level of QoG achieved in an 
authoritarian country cannot be the highest possible, since it is always subordinated to the 
predatory nature of rulers. Along these lines, the available evidence points out that even the most 
successful examples of “developmentalist” dictators with encompassing interests in their 
domains, like Park or Franco, provided rent-seeking goods to particular groups and exhibited 
certain records of corruption.16 Similarly, since dictators are not (or do not need to be) responsive 
to citizens’ demands, it is difficult to predict an increase or decrease in QoG when moving from 
lower-income autocracies to higher-income ones. On the one hand, richer countries can be 
expected to afford better institutions (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2007: 5). On the other, the richer the 
country, the bigger the pool of resources from which a dictator can predate without the need to 
undertake costly investments for the provision of public goods or the protection of property 
                                                 
16 E.g. see Tortella’s (2000) or Garcia Delgado’s (2000) accounts of Franco’s industrial policy.  
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rights.17 Therefore, despite the technical capabilities to enhance QoG can be expected to be 
higher in rich than in poor autocracies, the incentives of rulers to do so can be expected to be 
lower.18  
In relation to rich democracies, the argument here is straightforward: in order to survive 
in office, democratic incumbents must be responsive to citizens with relatively low future 
discount rates interested in an administration capable of providing benefits at medium- long-term, 
such as rule of law to protect their property rights or investments in the development of human 
capital (e.g. health care, education). Democratic rulers, like corporate managers subject to 
competition, will try to signal to their shareholders-voters that they are the most competent ones 
to bring them stable prosperity. The evidence in support of this correlation between high-income 
democracies and good governance is overwhelming: the best performers in any ranking of QoG 
are rich democracies. In sum, the prediction of this theoretical section is that the level of 
democracy will have a negative effect on QoG in lower-income countries, while it will have a 
positive impact in higher-income countries.  
4. Data and Methods 
The Dependent Variable     
This paper uses as a proxy for QoG the same variable as Bäck and Hadenius (2008) –which they 
call ‘state capacity’ and which covers 140 states from 1984-2002.  The measure is a combination 
of two of the three indicators from the Political Risk Services’ (PRS) ICRG data.  These two 
components are ‘bureaucratic quality’ and ‘level of perceived corruption’ and are combined into a 
single index that ranges from ‘0’ to ‘10’, with higher values indicating better QoG.  For 
                                                 
17 As Bates (2001) claims in his comparison between resource-poor countries (e.g. Modern European 
Absolutist Monarchies, or post-colonial Asia), whose rulers invested heavily in building administrative 
capabilities, and resource-rich ones (e.g. post-colonial Africa), whose rulers relied on patronage-ridden 
corrupt administrations, the autocrats’ incentives for providing QoG may be affected by country’s initial 
level of resources or income. 
18 We are not in conditions here to empirically assess the notable within-autocracies differences in terms of 
QoG that are obvious to any observer: why do some dictators behave like South Korea’s Park or Spain’s 
Franco, investing in rule of law and meritocratic-Weberian administrations while others behave a la 
Mobutu? Using appropriate empirical proxies and a clear theoretical guidance that we lack for this analysis, 
future research should explore the potentiality of systematic within-autocracies differences in QoG.     
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bureaucratic performance, states receive a higher score when they are perceived to be able to 
withstand a change in government without experiencing traumatic disruptions of services and 
day-to-day administrative functions.  States with high risk scores (or lower bureaucratic quality) 
are unable to adjust to a change in government and this tends to be disruptive with respect to 
policy formulation and implementation and daily administrative duties. The corruption element of 
the index assess whether potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics 
and business is common or seldom. The mean value for this variable in the sample is 5.36 with a 
standard deviation of 2.4 and has a total of 2,437 observations.19      
The Independent Variables 
        On the ‘supply side’, we measure Democracy as a combination of Freedom House and 
Polity scores, taken from the Quality of Government Institute database (Teorell et al 2008).  This 
measure is standardized and ranges from 0-10, with higher scores equating higher levels of 
democracy. The average of Freedom House is the scaled from 0-10 and Polity is measured from 
0-10 as well. The two measures are then averaged together. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) find that 
this combined index is superior both in terms of validity and reliability to either Freedom House 
or Polity independently (Teorell et al. 2008).   
        On the “demand side”, as mentioned above, the measure for economic development 
employed here is intended to serve as a proxy for the concept of future discount rate.  Though 
alternative measures -such as a more refined indicator of standard of living or education levels- 
might be superior proxies for a country’s average subjective future discount rate, they are 
                                                 
19 The most common form of corruption met directly by “business is financial corruption in the form of 
demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessments, police protection, or loans” (see Teorell, Holmberg and Rothstein 2008). For a more detailed 
description of this variable, please refer to either the Quality of Government Institute’s database codebook 
at: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/ or the PRS Group website: http://www.prsgroup.com/  
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significantly less available across space and time with respect to the data.20 Due to a wide scope 
of availability, the country’s level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is used in this 
analysis.  This variable is the natural logarithm of the constant value in US dollars for 1995, taken 
from the World Development Index at the World Bank.  Combining the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ of 
QoG to test the primary hypothesis of this paper, we generate an interaction term between 
democracy and income. 
To control for Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) hypothesis on the nonlinearity between 
democracy and QoG, we also square the level of democracy. To control for Keefer’s (2007) 
hypothesis on the impact of time and experience with democracy, we construct an additive count 
variable, which takes into consideration not only for how many years country ‘X’ has 
experienced democracy, but also the ‘depth’ of its democratic institutions. At time ‘t’, this 
variable is the sum of all previous years of the Freedom House/ Polity democracy measure since 
1972 (the first point in our dataset). Thus this indicator captures both ‘depth’ of democracy (uses 
a 10-point scale as calculated by Freedom House and Polity) and ‘time’ or ‘experience’ (each 
year is equal to year ‘t’ plus the sum total of all democracy scores before it dating back to 1970). 
For example, by 2004, an authoritarian state such as Libya has an additive ‘democratic 
experience’ score of 35.58, while an ‘experienced’ democracy such as Denmark has a score of 
330.   
Additionally, due to the time series nature of the data, we include a time count trend that 
begins with the first year that ICRG began to code their international risk assessments.  We do 
this for two reasons. First, as it is common in TSCS data, the count variable helps to avoid 
problems associated with spurious correlation when both the dependent variable and the primary 
independent variables vary independently, but in a constant trend over time (Tavits 2005).  This is 
the case with the dependent variable (ICRG), democracy and GDP data, thus the count variable 
                                                 
20 Likewise, if there were reliable cross-time comparative indicators, it would also be interesting to test the 
impact of other alternative variables could have an impact in a country’s propensity to invest or future 
discount rates, such as income inequality. 
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would be necessary to control for this tendency. Secondly, since the dependent variable is based 
on subjective perceptions, the time count variable is expected to help us correct for potential year-
to-year differences in the administration of the PRS Group’s surveys (e.g. one can expect cross-
time changes in the composition of the respondents or in the way questions are framed) and 
trends in the systematic diachronic changes.   
         We also include a number of control variables in the model.21 The first control variable 
captures a country’s level of trade openness, measured as imports plus exports divided by GDP.  
Earlier empirical studies have found that open countries are less corrupt relative to more closed 
economies (Sandholz and Gray 2003).  We thus expect this variable to have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable.  The second control is a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the country is a former British colony. Based on numerous previous empirical 
studies, we expect both trade openness and being a former British colony to have a positive 
impact on administrative capacity (La Porta et al 1999; Bäck and Hadenius 2008). Following the 
advice of Teorell and Hadenius (2007) a dependent variable lagged by one year in all of the 
models is included to account for potential first order serial correlation. Obviously, questions 
about causality may arise in a study that examines the effect of democracy and economic growth 
on quality of government. Although we cannot completely solve this potential problem of two-
way causality between QoG and income, we follow previous literature (e.g. Bäck and Hadenius 
2008) and lag all independent variables by one year, which also helps to answer any questions 
about endogeneity and directional causality, modeling the impact of the independent variable 
occurring before the event of the dependent variable diachronically.   
        Section 5 offers a model specification similar to the Bäck and Hadenius article, in that we 
run a time series, cross sectional model with panel controlled standard errors (PCSE’s) following 
the advice of Beck and Katz (1995).  However, some problems may arise when repeated 
                                                 
 
21 Again, we specify our time series model in this aspect in a similar fashion to Bäck and Hadenius (2008). 
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observations per unit (country in this case) because the observations may not be independent.  
Thus additional models are run for robustness checks, including a fixed effects model (with 
PCSE’s) with country dummies included so as to gauge the effect of the independent variables 
only within countries over time.  In fixed effects models, all time invariant explanatory variables, 
such as the British colony dummy, are excluded.  Such models help to account for panel 
intercepts that differ from country to country. Additionally, we run a random effects model with 
robust standard errors, which the random error vi is heterogeneity-specific to each country, to 
account for not only potential deviation in the intercept across country observations, but 
individual differences are considered random rather than fixed and estimable.  Thus the intercept 
is a random outcome variable (or random effect), which is a function of a mean value plus a 
random error.  
      To add robustness to the findings in section 5, a cross-sectional analysis is done in section 6.  
Due to a wider scope of cross sectional availabilities in the data, we account for a number of 
alternative hypotheses in addition to trade openness and former UK colonies.  First, we test for 
press freedom, which we expect will be associated with better QoG (Brunetti and Weber 2003; 
Adsera, Boix and Payne 2003).  Press freedom from Freedom House, has ratings for up to 192 
countries world wide and scales states from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free), which we invert.  
Further, Treisman’s measure of the number of newspapers per 1000 inhabitants (Treisman 2000) 
is also used.  Secondly, we include level of education, which we take from Barro and Lee (2000).  
The measure captures the average number of schooling years for those in the population segment 
of 15 years and older, which is available for 103 countries. Third, we use ethnic fractionalization 
which is expected to have a negative impact on QoG (La Porta et al 1999; Alesina et al 2003; 
Charron 2007).  We include Alesina el al’s (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization, which uses 
the Herfindel index to calculate the odds of selecting two random people from different ethno-
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linguistic backgrounds within a population22.  Fourth, we control for the number of veto players 
(Tsebelis 1995) in the model, which we take from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer et 
al 2006). Based on Andrews and Montinola (2004), we expect that this relationship will be 
positive. Finally, we control again for Keefer’s ‘democratic experience’ hypothesis using 
Treisman’s (2000) variable of the number of years a country has remained classified as a 
democracy since 1930 (ranking as 6 or higher on Beck et al.’s ‘Executive Index of Electoral 
Competition’, Beck et al 2003).  All cross sectional variables are taken from the Quality of 
Government Institute’s cross sectional database (Teorell et al 2008). 
5. Time Series Analysis 
Table 1 displays 7 empirical models designed to test our hypothesis relative to the hypotheses of 
Bäck and Hadenius (2008) and Keefer (2007).  We begin by replicating the Bäck and Hadenius 
primary results, demonstrating their finding – that the ‘J’-shaped relationship between 
democratization and administrative performance is indeed significant.23  These results support the 
assertion that strong authoritarian states are expected to perform better on average than those in 
the middle of the democratic scale, while strong democracies are associated with the highest 
scores of QoG.  In model 2, we run a baseline test of our primary hypothesis, which states that the 
interaction between economic growth and democratic development has greater explanatory power 
in explaining the pattern in the data of administrative performance than does the squared 
democracy variable.  In this basic baseline model (including the lagged dependent variable) we 
find initial support for our hypothesis.  At low levels of economic development, the effect of 
democracy is indeed negative on administrative capacity, and the interaction term is positive and 
significant at the 99% level of confidence.  Thus, the prediction that the impact of democracy is 
contingent on economic growth is corroborated in that, when adding the total effects of the three 
                                                 
22 The standard Herfindahl index is:  
23 We wish to thank Hannah Bäck for allowing us to use her data for this replication 
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variables, the impact of democracy is actually positive for states with higher levels of economic 
growth.  
***Table 1 About Here*** 
        In model 3 we replace the squared democracy term with the indicator for our primary 
hypothesis, the interaction term between democracy and economic growth.  Similar to the 
baseline model, we find that even when trade openness and British colonial heritage are 
controlled for, the interaction term is robust and remains strongly positive and significant at the 
99% level of confidence.  The coefficient for economic growth drops below the 90% level of 
confidence, which with the inclusion of the interaction term, indicates that there is no significant 
effect of economic growth on QoG in strong autocracies.  Democracy remains strongly negative, 
meaning that, at low levels of economic development, democratization has a negative impact on 
government quality.  
         Model 4 includes control variables with the proxy for Keefer’s hypothesis - the ‘democratic 
experience’ variable along with the time count variable.  We observe similar results to the initial 
baseline model. On its own - that is, not taking into account the level of democracy - GDP does 
not exert a significant effect on QoG. Second, democracy has a significantly negative impact on 
administrative performance when economic development is low, yet the interaction term remains 
significant and positive.  When calculating the impact of democratization at higher levels of 
economic development, its impact is indeed positive (see Table 1).  The control variables in the 
model from the Bäck and Hadenius article remain robust, with British colonies and trade 
openness being positive determinants of a quality bureaucracy.  Surprisingly, the ‘democratic 
experience’ variable, while in the expected direction, fails to reach the 90% level of significance 
– even without the inclusion of the squared democracy variable. This shows the strength of the 
interactive effect between income and democracy relative to the alternative explanation of 
administrative performance as a result of the accumulated experience with democracy. Finally, 
the ‘year count’ variable indicates that there is a diachronic, negative trend in the dependent 
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variable, and this relationship is strong. Whether or not this is ‘actually’ happening – that 
bureaucratic services have been deteriorating in quality since the 1980’s is of course debatable, 
but in terms of the PRS Group’s chronicle of this concept, there is certainly a downward trend 
that this variable has captured.  
        The fifth model in Table 1 tests all of the hypotheses together in order to gauge their relative 
strength to one another. Here we observe that the results in models 2 and 3 hold even when 
accounting for the squared democracy variable, which drops below the 90% level of significance 
when the interaction, time count and democratic experience are included24. In models 6 and 7, we 
test for robustness of the results in model 4, including all explanatory variables. Model 6 presents 
the fixed effects results with country dummies, which capture only variation over time within 
countries. While the negative significance of democratization at low levels of economic 
development is no longer significant, the interaction effect remains positive and significant at the 
99% level of confidence. The random effects model (model 7), known for producing larger 
standard errors, thus expected to produce weaker results, demonstrates quite similar estimates 
compared with model 5, which provides further support for our findings.   
***Figure 2 about Here** 
        Following the advice of Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), Figure 2 shows the impact of 
democracy at various levels of economic development according to the estimates in model 3 in 
table 1.25  Due to the difficulties in interpreting interaction terms, this visual provides additional 
clarity.  The bold line represents the marginal effect of democracy on QoG and demonstrates how 
this effect in fact changes at various levels of economic development.  The two dashed-lines 
around the marginal effect of democracy indicate a 95% confidence interval according to the 
                                                 
24 Because the ‘democracy squared’ and ‘democratic experience’ variables are correlated at .68, we were 
concerned about possible issues with multicollinearity.  We ran a similar model to model 5 in Table 1 
without the ‘depth of democracy’ variable.  While the coefficient increases slightly to .0024, the standard 
error remains the same, rendering the ‘squared democracy’ variable statistically indistinguishable from ‘0’.   
25 The impact of democracy without the inclusion of the squared term is chosen for interpretation for the 
sake of clarity due to the statistical insignificance of the squared term in models 5-7 and the ‘democratic 
experience’ variable in models 4-7. 
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regression Table 1.  When both the upper and lower bounds are either above and below the zero 
line, democracy has a significantly positive or negative impact on QoG respectively.  Thus we 
may observe the conditions that democracy has a statistically significant impact (negative or 
positive) on the dependent variable.  One caveat in interpreting these numbers is needed. When 
the lagged dependent variable is included in any time series model, the remaining explanatory 
variables account for any changes in the dependent variable away from its first-order lagged 
trend. This explains why the coefficients in the model (aside from the lagged dependent variable) 
might seem relatively small.  According to the summary statistics (see appendix), the mean of the 
log of GDP per capita is 7.5 with a standard deviation of 1.6.  Therefore from roughly the mean 
per capita country income in the sample to 4.5 (about 1.85 standard deviations below the mean) 
the effect of democracy on QoG is negative yet statistically insignificant.  However, for the 
poorest states - slightly above two standard deviations below the mean and below - the effect of 
democracy is predicted to actually reduce QoG, as predicted in Figure 1.  Conversely, the impact 
of democracy on QoG is positive and statistically significant for countries with a level of 
economic development slightly above the mean value in the sample (about 7.6 and above).  A one 
standard deviation increase in democracy for a country with a GDP per capita one standard 
deviation above the mean results in an increase in QoG by .03.  This impact is predicted to 
increase as economic development increase, also predicted in Figure 1.   
6. Cross Sectional Extension and Robustness Checks 
        The overwhelming majority of empirical studies on the determinants of quality of 
government have used cross sectional data exclusively (La Porta et al 1999; Treisman 2000; 
Fisman and Gatti 2002; Jackman and Montinola 2002).  This section replicates our model and 
tests for numerous other alternative explanations using cross sectional data from 2002 to check 
for the robustness of the results from the time series models. However, one caveat must be taken 
into consideration in relation to the following results: to make easier the comparison with 
previous cross-sectional analysis, the dependent variable (QoG) contains here one element in 
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addition to bureaucratic quality and corruption perception from the previous section.  The 
dependent variable here, taken from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide, also 
contains ‘rule of law and order’.  ‘Law’ is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system, while ‘order’ is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  The total measure 
combines the three indicators – ‘bureaucracy’, ‘corruption’ and ‘rule of law and order’ averaged 
together and scaled from ‘0’-‘1’, with higher scores indicating better QoG.26  
***Table 2 about Here*** 
        Table 2 displays the results of the cross sectional analyses.  We begin with the same 
specification as model 3 in table 1, using trade openness and former UK colony as control 
variables. We find that the results support the time series model for the primary variables in that 
the democracy variable is negative and highly significant and the interaction term is positive and 
also highly significant. At low levels of economic development, democratization lowers 
government quality, while at moderate to high levels of wealth, democracy has a positive effect.  
The only notable difference is that economic development has now a positive and significant 
impact on the dependent variable even for authoritarian states in some of the cross-sectional 
models. Although this result is not robust when controlling for newspapers circulation (model 4) 
and education levels (model 5). 
        Briefly, in models 2-8, which test alternative hypotheses, we find that none of the rivals 
better explains QoG than the interaction between democracy and development.  The squared 
democracy variable is far from significant in model 2.  In models 3 and 4, both press variables are 
strongly significant and positive determinants of quality of government in the model.  Though 
both coefficients are in the expected direction, the level of education (number of years of 
                                                 
26 The results do not substantially change if we use the same dependent variable as Bäck and Hadenius 
(2008) as well as in our time series analysis instead of the total measure of the three indicators of ICRG. 
Nevertheless, we choose to present the results with the three components of the ICRG index because it has 
been more extensively used for cross-sectional analyses than the two components studied by Bäck and 
Hadenius. If in the time series section we aim at replicating Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) encompassing 
analysis, here the goal is to replicate the most relevant cross-sectional studies on QoG, which tend to 
include proxies for “ruler of law” as well. 
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schooling) appears to have no significant effect on the dependent variable in model 5, nor does 
ethnic fractionalization in model 6.  In model 7 we control for the number of veto players, but it 
does not seem to exert a significant effect. In model 8 we test Keefer’s or the ‘democracy 
experience’ hypothesis, which receives some empirical support, but it is only significant at the 
90% level of confidence. The bottom line of the cross-sectional analysis is that the interaction 
between democracy and income remains strongly significant despite the inclusion of a number of 
alternative hypotheses, adding robust support to the cross-time results.   
7. Conclusion and Further Discussion 
This paper has addressed one of the big questions in comparative politics: “What types of 
governments are most likely to have economic policies and institutions that generate good 
economic performance?” (Clague et al. 1996: 243).  To answer it, we synthesize a number of 
relevant literatures and derive a relatively simple theory based on both institutional and cultural 
explanations.  Similar to earlier studies that address the impact of democracy on QoG, we find 
this relationship to be nonlinear.  Prior explanations and empirical models aiming to account for 
this non-linear relationship included a ‘squared-democracy’ variable or a ‘time or experience with 
democracy’ one. None of these variables stand as significant in our empirical model once we also 
test our hypothesis that the impact of democracy is conditioned by the level of economic 
development.  In democracies, when economic development is low, citizens’ demand for long-
term investments in bureaucratic capacity is also low.  They expect leaders to provide basic 
services more in line with the patron-client model.  Thus, a low level of QoG is predicted in such 
cases, even relative to authoritarian states, which are to some degree more shielded from the 
demands of the citizens and can ‘afford’ to make small investments for future improvements in 
QoG –if that enhances their capacity to survive in power or extract resources. Conversely, for 
democracies with higher levels of wealth, we argue that the ‘future discount’ rate of citizens (the 
demand side) is low enough for them to pressure leaders to undertake mid-to-long term 
investments in government quality. 
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         Our empirical results and conclusion parallel those of Lipset (1960): a democracy, to 
perform properly, to develop QoG, needs as a “prerequisite” some level of economic 
development.  On the one hand, like most scholars in the field, this paper cannot offer normative 
implications regarding the nature of the political regime because “there are examples of good - 
and of bad - economic performance under both autocratic and democratic governments” (Clague 
et al. 1996: 243). On the other hand, unlike the prevailing view in the literature that democracy is 
a “complex phenomenon with unpredictable effects” (Moran 2001: 390; Sung 2004: 179), we 
argue that the effects of democracy can be predictable if we take into account the economic 
context in which it emerges.   
        This paper sheds light on what has been defined as the “contradictory” relationship between 
democracy and corruption (Harris-White and White 1996:3; Sung 2004:179) by looking at both 
the supply and the demand side of QoG. Institutionalist authors criticize the “methodological 
inconsistency” of the explanations that assume individuals are self-interested, but dictators are 
benevolent (Clague at al. 1996: 244). We consider that there is also a methodological 
inconsistency in the institutionalist explanations focused exclusively on rulers. If rulers are 
considered as self-interested individuals who frequently have short time horizons, why should we 
not assume that their fellow citizens may also have similar preferences?   
This analysis also elucidates some of the controversies surrounding the relationship 
between the level of economic development and the QoG. Do quality government institutions 
foster economic growth or are quality government institutions simply the result of economic 
development?  Though one must always be cautious in making claims about the direction of 
causality, we argue that our design best captures potential problems of endogeneity by accounting 
for changes in time using one-year lags of all explanatory variables (including the lagged 
dependent variable).  Accounting for cross sectional effects as well, we argue that our design is 
not only a contribution to the literature in the sense of specification (the operationalization of the 
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theorized interaction term) but also by best accounting for the causal direction of the relationship 
specified.   
        Literature explaining quality of government has found a positive effect of the level of 
economic development on QoG although several studies have pointed out very diverse theoretical 
mechanisms. To start with, income increases may foster QoG because richer countries can be 
expected to afford better institutions and many variables correlated with income, such as 
schooling levels or urbanization, may decrease the social tolerance of corruption (Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh 2007: 5). For Inglehart (2008) economic development gives individuals resources to shift 
from survival to self-expression values. For Montinola and Jackman (2002), on the contrary, 
economic development is a proxy for the level of public sector wages. Since one may expect 
poorly-paid government officials to be more prone to complement their salaries with bribes, the 
higher the public sector wages, the lower corruption one should see. The positive impact of 
income would thus be simply capturing the effects of public wages. All these mechanisms imply 
an independent effect of the level of economic development on QoG. Nevertheless, the analysis 
of this paper shows that the level of economic development does not exert a significant effect on 
its own, but only in democracies.   
In sum, this paper provides and tests some basic micro-foundations to explain a certain 
paradox for several international observers: that dictatorships could be “good” at early stages of 
development, but are “bad” afterwards. One frequently finds in the press statements like this: 
“Like South Korea, Taiwan, and now China, Vietnam has shown it is possible to escape poverty 
under authoritarianism. But it is surely no coincidence that most of the world’s richest countries 
by income per head are liberal democracies” (The Economist, April 26th 2008). This paper has 
offered some tentative mechanisms for these “no coincidences”: while you are poor, a dictator 
may provide better QoG; on the contrary, when you achieve certain level of development, good 
bureaucracy and administrative services and lower corruption are better provided by democratic 
rulers.    
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Note: Figure 2 done in STATA with the help of the commands from Brambor, Clark & Golder (2006) found at: 
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html 
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Table 1 – The Conditional Impact of Democracy on QoG 
       
    Pooled T.S.C.S      Robustness Checks 
  Replicated Baseline Baseline 
Add Dem. 
Exp. 
Full 
Model  Fixed Random 
  Model¹ Model 
w/ 
Controls 
& time 
count 
w/ Sq. 
Dem.  Effectsª Effects 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
                    
Democracy -.055** -.034** -.052*** -.030* -.043**  -.024 -.042** 
  (.020) (.014) (.017) (.016) (.019)  (.030) (.018) 
Democracy² .007*** - - - .0023  0.065 0.009 
  (.002)    (.0018)  (.090) (.013) 
GDP per cap. .039** .015 .004 .005 .008  .0018 .0024 
  (.019) (.018) (.016) (.015) (.017)  (.0029) (.0018) 
Dem X GDP - .006*** .008*** .006*** .005**  .0055*** .005*** 
   (.0017) (.002) (.002) (.002)  (.0021) (.0017) 
Trade  -.020 - -.002 .052** .049**  .171** .051* 
  (.032)  (.028) (.025) (.024)  (.078) (.028) 
UK Colony .072*** - .075*** .057** .062***  - .062*** 
  (.023)  (.023) (.023) (.023)  (.149) (.024) 
Year Count - - -.022*** -.021***  -.033*** -.021*** 
     (.005) (.004)  (.005) (.002) 
Democratic Experience - - .0002 .0002  .0014* .0002 
     (.0002) (.0002)  (.0008) (.0002) 
Lag Dep. Var. .927*** .933*** .925*** 0.924*** .923***  .882*** .922*** 
  (.019) (.019) (.008) (.019) (.019)  (.011) (.008) 
Constant  .089 1.51*** .235** .661*** .702***  .422 .703*** 
  (.096) (.281) (.110) (.155) (.162)  (.678) (.107) 
Obs.  1998 2077 1998 1990 1990   1990 
Countries 127 130 127 127 127  127 127 
R²  .96 .94 .96 .96 .96  .96 .96 
                  
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘Quality of Government’ scaled so that higher scores indicate better government performance (0-10). 
¹Model replicated from Bäck and Hadenius (2008) 
  
All estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses (xtpcse) 
ªFixed effects model run with country dummies (xtpcse in STATA).  Random effects with robust standard errors 
p*<.10, p**<.05, p***<.01 
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Table 2 - Cross Sectional Regression Results – Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks  
          
  Baseline Squared Press News Education Ethnic Veto  Democracy
  Model Democracy Freedom Circulation Years Frac. Players Experience 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
Democracy -.106*** -.108*** -.113*** -.103** -.114*** -.106*** -.108*** -.088** 
  (.027) (.029) (.025) (.036) (.034) (.027) (.028) (.030) 
GDP per cap. .035* .037** .036** .004 .006 .041** .038** .040** 
  (.019) (.018) (.017) (.024) (.032) (.018) (.018) (.019) 
Dem X GDP .014*** .012*** .011*** .013*** .015*** .014*** .013*** .011*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.029) 
Trade  .0004 .0003 .0005 .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003 .0001 
  (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) 
UK Colony .051* .051* .039 .042 .078** .051* .044 .040 
  (.026) (.027) (.026) (.027) (.031) (.026) (.026) (.027) 
Democracy²  .001       
   (.002)       
Press Freedom  .005***      
    (.0009)      
Newspaper Circulation   .0004***     
     (.0001)     
Education Years    .286    
      (.244)    
Ethnic Fractionalization     -.030   
       (.041)   
Veto Players       .012  
        (.011)  
Democratic Experience       .0015* 
         (.0008) 
Constant  .094 .097 .509** .341 .286 .032 .069 .067 
  (.154) (.163) (.179) (.212) (.244) (.159) (.161) (.164) 
Countries 136 136 136 116 93 135 130 135 
R²  .69 .69 .74 .70 .77 .70 .69 .71 
                    
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘Quality of Government’ scaled so that higher scores indicate better government 
performance (0-10).  p*<.10, p**<.05, p***<.01 
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Appendix – Descriptive Statistics 
Time Series Data    
Variable   Obs.  Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
PRS - QoG  2437 5.36 2.46 0 10 
GDP(log)  5053 7.52 1.55 3.89 10.99 
Democracy 5403 5.18 3.51 0 10 
GDP*Dem  5403 45.82 32.98 0 109.99 
Democracy² 5403 39.22 38.20 0 10 
Dem. Experience 6751 63.71 74.84 0 330 
British Colony 6176 .336 .475 0 1 
Trade Openness 4467 .725 .409 .015 2.85 
              
       
Cross-Sectional Data    
Variable   Obs.  Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
PRS - QoG  139 .522 .207 .111 1 
GDP(log)  192 8.52 1.18 5.82 10.79 
Democracy 192 6.65 3.17 0 10 
GDP*Dem  192 57.32 31.62 0 107.91 
Democracy² 192 52.69 37.02 0 100 
Dem. Experience 173 18.06 21.49 0 70 
British Colony 192 .297 .458 0 1 
Trade Openness 133 85.44 45.54 18.22 279.55 
News Circulation 135 99.65 124.50 0 588 
Education Years 104 6.13 2.84 .84 12.05 
Fractionalization 187 .437 .256 0 .931 
Veto Players 165 2.81 1.42 1 7 
Press Freedom 192 44.78 25.32 8 96 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
